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I propose to consider some of the challenges that the addition of jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression will present to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). Article 5 of the Rome Statute gave the Court jurisdiction over “the crime 
of aggression . . . once a provision is adopted . . . defining the crime and setting 
out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to 
this crime.”1 In the absence of adoption by consensus, adoption required a two-
thirds majority.
2
 But the amendment would enter into force for all States Parties 
after ratification or acceptance by seven-eighths of them.
3
 
At the seven-year Review Conference in Kampala in 2010, the Assembly of 
States Parties amended the Statute by adding a new article, Article 8 bis,
4
 on the 
crime of aggression.
5
 The new provision incorporates the seven acts in the 1974 
U.N. General Assembly’s “Definition of Aggression.”6 
                                                     
† This Essay is based on remarks made by Professor Reisman during a panel discussion 
preceding Luis Ocampo’s inaugural Gruber Distinguished Lecture in Global Justice at Yale 
Law School on Jan. 28, 2013.  
†† McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School. 
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5(1)-(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
2. Id. art. 121(4). 
3. Id. The exceptional arrangement for amendments to Article 5, establishing that they would not 
apply to the nationals or on the territory of a State which had not accepted that amendment, is 
not relevant to the activation of the crime of aggression, since crime of aggression is already 
included in Article 5. 
4. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis. 
5. Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, 
Uganda, May 31-June 11, 2010, The Crime of Aggression, RC/Res.6, Annex I (June 11, 2010), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/OR/RC-11-ENG.pdf. 
6. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 
1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression]. 
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Kampala deferred the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. In the meanwhile, only four tiny states have endorsed it,
7
 and others 
do not appear to be lining up. Moreover, Kampala added carve-outs to the Statute 
that insulate non-party and non-ratifying states from its application.
8
 Nonetheless, 
in Kampala, the ICC has moved a step closer to exercising jurisdiction over what 
the General Assembly in 1974 called “the most serious and dangerous form of the 
illegal use of force.”9 So it is not entirely academic to begin to consider the 
implications of the prospective judicialization of the international community’s 
response to the crime of aggression for, first, the international political system; 
second, the international legal system; and finally, the ICC itself. But that, as 
Dostoevsky often said, requires us to go back. 
I. 
  International law has had a complicated, even love-hate relationship, with 
the use of force. Efforts to limit the unrestricted right of a state to resort to 
military force gained traction in the twentieth century; they began with the Porter 
Convention in 1907
10
 and culminated in the United Nations Charter in 1945. The 
Charter enjoined “[a]ll Members . . . in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”11 Lawful military force was to be authorized by the Security Council 
under its plenary Chapter VII powers. In case a state suffered an armed attack, it 
could resort to individual or collective self-defense pending action by the Security 
Council.
12
 The Council was the organ empowered to determine whether 
aggression had occurred and what to do about it.
13
 
  Whatever the intention of Charter Article 2(4) may have been, the 
international political system remained essentially co-archical; the Security 
Council, because of its voting procedures, was often unable to act and individual 
uses of force, without prior authorization by the Security Council, continued to 
occur. While all of them were, in terms of the black letter of the Charter, illegal, 
not all of them were considered by political and legal observers as unlawful in 
their context, though unanimity in appraisals of the lawfulness of unilateral 
actions (indeed, in the appraisal of anything in international law) has been rare. To 
mention only a few examples, wars of decolonization have not been deemed 
unlawful and the General Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International 
                                                     
7. Lichtenstein, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, and Luxembourg. 
8. The Crime of Aggression, RC/Res.6, supra note 5, at ¶ 1 & Annex 1, art. 15 bis. 
9. Definition of Aggression, supra note 6. 
10. Porter Convention on the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of 
Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607.  
11. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4. 
12. Id. art. 51.  
13. Id. art. 39.  




 went so far as to entitle peoples seeking self-determination to receive 
support from other states.
15
 Wars of national liberation have been deemed lawful. 
Overt and covert assistance in internal wars has rarely been sanctioned and often 
praised.
16
 Humanitarian interventions, protection of nationals abroad, blockades, 
military exercises as a means of conveying threats and so on, have all benefitted 
from a tolerance which the black letter of Article 2(4) would hardly support.
17
 
Plainly, when it comes to unilateral uses of force, one can detect the outlines 
of an “operational code” of the lawfulness of certain types of unilateral uses of 
military force, but rather than text, purpose and context have been proven critical 
in such appraisals. For example, when Turkey periodically invades northern Iraq 
to destroy Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) bases, from which attacks on Turkey 
had been emanating, there are few international condemnations, even though the 
Security Council has not authorized the actions. Yet, when the South African 
apartheid government conducted the same type of action against African National 
Congress (ANC) bases in Angola and Mozambique, or when Israel invaded 
Lebanon to suppress Hezbollah rocket attacks on its northern cities and towns, 
most political observers and many international lawyers condemned the actions as 
unlawful.
18
 When many of the NATO states mounted an aerial bombardment of 
Serbia over its actions in Kosovo, it was generally deemed lawful, even though 
the Security Council had not authorized the action. President Obama, in his Nobel 
Peace Prize acceptance speech, did not seem to have stunned his audience when 
he used the occasion to announce that “[t]here will be times when nations―acting 
individually or in concert―will find the use of force not only necessary but 
morally justified.”19 
Force is not opposed to law but is an integral part of legal arrangements; 
when it cannot be provided by a central authority, Pareto assured us, other actors 
will provide it.
20
 When it comes to making decisions about the crime of 
aggression, the question is how to judge or appraise the lawfulness of 
unauthorized uses of force in order to determine which are lawful and which are 
not, when the explicit law of the U.N. Charter prohibits all such uses. That “how” 
question is inextricably linked to the question of “who” decides. Let me explain. 
                                                     
14. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 
25/2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Oct. 24, 1970).  
15. Id. 
16. MICHAEL W. REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 384 
(2013). 
17. Id. at 385. 
18. Id. at 386-93. 
19. President Barack H. Obama, Nobel Lecture (Dec. 10, 2009), in Barack H. Obama, A Just and 
Lasting Peace, NOBEL PRIZE, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009 
/obama-lecture_en.html.  
20. 4 VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY 1519 (Arthur Livingston ed., 1935). 





 Colonel Smith, a legal officer in the Judge 
Advocate General Corps, currently has two major assignments. He chairs a court 
martial that has been convened to try an alleged violation of the law of war 
concerning cyberwar. He also leads a working group, which has been assembled 
by the Judge Advocate General, to appraise the adequacy of the Army’s 
codification of the law of war in the light of the emerging practice of cyberwar. 
Should the Colonel’s working group find the current codification ill-suited to deal 
with what it anticipates will be the future contours of cyberwar, it has been 
instructed to propose feasible recommendations for its amendment. 
In his function as a judge in the court martial, Smith is expected to limit his 
focus to the text of the code of law, as it exists, in the light of prior judgments in 
which it was applied by higher courts, and to apply it in strict conformity to the 
great nullum maxims: nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine crimine. By 
contrast, in his assignment to appraise the adequacy of the inherited law of war as 
it confronts the techniques of cyberwarfare in the twenty-first century, Smith and 
his working group will be looking through different lenses at a range of facts and 
political processes that go far beyond what he may properly address in his role as 
a member of a court-martial. In both of his roles, Smith will be functioning as a 
lawyer and discharging decision functions in a principled fashion. But in each, he 
will be expected to use a very different set of intellectual tools. 
The point of this hypothetical is that persons performing different types of 
legal jobs may have to use one of two entirely distinct modes of making 
principled decisions: a textual-rule-based mode and a policy-context-based mode. 
The modes are equally legitimate and both are principled in the sense that, in 
distinct types of situations, it is expected and demanded by those applying the 
modes and those to whom they are applied that they are to be executed according 
to their respective prescribed principles and procedures. But the principles and 
procedures of each are very different and are not interchangeable. Different legal 
jobs use entirely distinct modes of making principled decisions. In each job, the 
mode of decision and the faithfulness with which it is executed are critical factors 
in the legitimacy of that decision and, even, more generally, the legitimacy of the 
institution making the decision. 
In the most general terms, the textual-rule-based mode of decision-making 
requires the persons applying it to approach the issues before them through the 
prism of rules. In this mode, the central question is which rules apply. Great 
emphasis is placed on the origin and validity of the rules―whether they are 
properly derived from higher rules. The principles of interpretation of texts and 
other verbal formulations that lay claim to some authority are virtual articles of 
faith. A valid decision in this mode is “legal” to the extent that it identifies and 
                                                     
21. I elaborate this hypothetical in Chapter 6 of W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD 
ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND 
INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT (2013). 
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correctly applies the relevant rules and is consistent with prior decisions. Above 
all, the introduction of the decision-maker’s personal political or policy 
preferences is deemed improper. 
The policy-context-based mode of decision, by contrast, requires decision-
makers to approach the issues before them through the prism of policy and 
context. Rather than the question of which rules to apply, the questions underlying 
the policy-context-based mode of decision-making are, first, what the relevant 
values of the community are; second, which practicable arrangements will most 
efficiently optimize those goal values; and third, how those arrangements can be 
installed. The legitimacy of the textual-rule-based mode depends on its manifest 
fidelity to its rules; the legitimacy of the policy-context-based mode depends on 
the extent to which its consequences approximate the relevant values. 
As a criminal tribunal, the ICC is expected to use the textual-rule-based 
mode; the foundation of its legitimacy is the legality principle. The U.N. Security 
Council, heretofore the only international institution charged with determining 
whether aggression has been committed, is expected to use the policy-context-
based mode of decisionmaking; its foundational principle and assignment is the 
restoration of minimum world order when it has been disrupted. 
III. 
In 1974, when the U.N. General Assembly adopted the soi-disant “Definition 
of Aggression,” 22  the title “definition” was something of a misnomer. The 
Definition’s considerandum recited that the Assembly believed: “[A]lthough the 
question whether an act of aggression has been committed must be considered in 
the light of all the circumstances of each particular case, it is nevertheless 
desirable to formulate basic principles as guidance for such determination . . . .”23 
Article 2 deferred to the Security Council’s broad discretion in the matter: 
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter 
shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although 
the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that 
a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not 
be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the 




Article 3 of the Resolution’s Definition identified, in seven sub-paragraphs, 
the acts which “shall . . . qualify as an act of aggression:”25 
                                                     
22. Definition of Aggression, supra note 6. 
23. Id. (emphasis added). 
24. Id. art. 2. (emphasis added). 
25. Id. art. 3. 
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(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory 
of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, re-
sulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use 
of force of the territory of another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of 
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the terri-
tory of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of 
another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forc-
es, or marine and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory 
of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in con-
travention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any 
extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination 
of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at 
the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for per-
petrating an act of aggression against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, ir-
regulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, 
or its substantial involvement therein.
26
 
However, the opening sentence of Article 3 makes the determination of those 
acts “subject to and in accordance with the provisions of Article 2,”27 which 
affirmed the case-by-case discretion of the Security Council. Article 4 concedes 
the authority of the Security Council to “determine that other acts constitute 
aggression.”28 
Article 5(1) states that “[n]o consideration of whatever nature, whether 
political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for 
aggression.” 29  But Article 7 carves a big exception to the exclusion of 
justifications for aggression: 
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way 
prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as 
                                                     
26. Id. art. 3. 
27. Id. art. 3. 
28. Id. art. 4. 
29. Id. art. 5(1). 
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derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and 
referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colo-
nial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right 
of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, 




In sum, the 1974 Definition, if read in its entirety, was far from a 
“definition.” To borrow the timeless words of Captain Barbossa, quondam 
commander of the Black Pearl, it was “more what you’d call Guidelines than 
actual rules.” 31  Guidelines, moreover, which were subject to the Security 
Council’s contextual appreciation of each action in the light of its own 
institutional mission. 
IV. 
Annex I of the Kampala resolution in 2010 added Article 8 bis to the Rome 
Statute as the “Crime of Aggression.” Paragraph 1 limits the potential perpetrators 
of the crime to “a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State.”32 Paragraph 2 incorporates the 
definitional language of Article 1 of the 1974 Definition and copies the specific 
acts in Article 3 of the Definition in accordance with the Assembly’s resolution.33 
That is the only part of the General Assembly’s Definition that is incorporated 
into the ICC Statute. 
Two material changes have taken place here. First, the nuanced and highly 
qualified “guideline” character of the 1974 Definition has been discarded, and in 
its place, only one provision―the Definition’s Article 3―has been carried over to 
the Statute. What had been a set of guidelines, which it was repeatedly confirmed 
the Security Council had discretion in applying, has become a code. Second, the 
agency for which the 1974 Definition had been drafted, the Security Council―a 
political body which deploys the policy-contextual-mode of decisionmaking to 
execute its mandate “to maintain or restore international peace and security”―has 
been replaced by a criminal court, whose modus operandi is the textual-rule-based 
mode of decision. The relation between the two changes is not accidental, for a 
criminal court condemning persons in its docket will by its nature rely on codified 
law. So even though the words in Article 8 bis of the ICC Statute are the same as 
those in Article 3 of the 1974 Definition, the result is quite different. 
                                                     
30. Id. art. 7. 
31. PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney Pictures 2003). 
32. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis(1); The Crime of Aggression, RC/Res.6, supra note 5. 
33. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 bis(2). 
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V. 
I began by asking whether the judicialization of the crime of aggression is 
good for the international political system, good for international law, and good 
for the ICC. If the amendment ever comes into force (which is uncertain), much 
will depend on how the ICC’s judges manage the prosecution of the crime. 
However, in general, I doubt that the amendment will contribute to bringing about 
and preserving the level of minimum order that is prerequisite to the enhancement 
of human dignity. 
I believe that some unilateral threats and uses of force will episodically 
continue to be fundamental to the maintenance of minimum world order. The 
prospective judicial characterization of such uses as aggression―one thinks of 
NATO’s action against Serbia―could chill the willingness of states to engage in 
it, even when, as President Obama said, such actions might be “not only necessary 
but morally justified.”34 Conversely, I find it fanciful to believe that the existence 
of the Statute and the Court will act as a deterrent to those contemplating wicked 
actions. 
As for its effect on international law, the jus ad bellum, in my view, has 
become much more complex than a simple reading of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the 
Charter, so ignoring that complexity and transforming the 1974 Definition’s 
guideline-character into something more like a code, that is less connected to 
political reality, could undermine belief in the relevance of international law. 
Nor do I think that the judicialization of aggression is likely to enhance the 
stature of the ICC. If the Court is faithful to the textual-rule-based mode of 
decisionmaking, it will be compelled to hold as criminal actions that are 
consistent with expectations of lawfulness. If it does not do so, it will undermine 
its image of legitimacy by appearing only to follow the legality principle when the 
results suit it. Even if one assumes that the entire, nuanced and discretionary 1974 
definition has been incorporated by reference into the Rome Statute, Article 8 bis 
will require the Court to function as a mini-Security Council and allow it to apply 
the same political judgments as the Council. If the Court takes this route, it could 
infect the Court’s whole judicial culture with respect to its judgments for many of 
the other crimes in its bailiwick. 
Of course, judges are, as they must be, resourceful jurists, and the Bench of 
the ICC may surprise us. Let us hope that it does. 
 
                                                     
34. Obama, supra note 19. 
